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Abstract
Research in strategic management has shown that the timing of firm participation in a merger wave matters, as
early movers have been shown to outperform later ones. However, while the consequences of the timing of
action within a merger wave have been assessed, the causes that drive these timing effects remain unknown.
We draw on the competitive dynamics perspective to investigate firm-level factors that influence the large-scale
strategic behavior of leading or following within industry merger waves. We develop hypotheses based on the
competitive dynamics argument that the awareness-motivation-capability of firms will influence the timing of
competitive action. Consistent with this perspective, we show that a firm's strategic orientation, its structure,
and its resource base influence the timing of firm entry in merger waves.

Introduction
Merger waves are periods of intense acquisition activity. Research from economics and finance shows that
merger waves are triggered by buoyant stock prices reflected in high market-to-book ratios (Polonchek and
Sushka, 1987). They are also prompted by shocks, such as deregulation, financing innovations (e.g., Mitchell and
Mulherin, 1996), and technological innovations (e.g., Mulherin and Boone, 2000), which are spurred on by high
capital liquidity (e.g., Harford, 2005). Hence, a substantial body of research has examined macroeconomic and
industry-level factors that contribute to the emergence of merger waves. However, research in economics and
finance has been largely silent on firm-level drivers of merger wave activity.
In the strategy field, research has begun to examine firm-level issues with merger waves but has focused on the
consequences associated with merger wave activity. Drawing on first-mover advantage theory, research shows
that the timing of participation in the wave matters, as early movers outperform later ones (Carow, Heron, and
Saxton, 2004; McNamara, Haleblian, and Dykes, 2008). This work suggests that early movers have superior
information to preempt their rivals in identifying the best acquisition targets and acquire firms that offer the
greatest potential for synergies before the market accounts for the potential value associated with the merger
wave. Yet, while this work points to the consequences of firm timing within a wave, no work has been conducted
to determine the firm-level causes that drive the timing of a firm's action within a wave. Hence, while we know
that early movers perform best, we do not know the characteristics that these firms possess that allow them to
move earlier than their rivals. Thus, an important question relating to merger waves remains unanswered: ‘what
are the firm-level characteristics that impact when a firm enters an industry merger wave?’
To help answer this question, we draw on a competitive dynamics perspective. Broadly speaking, competitive
dynamics focuses on the causes and consequences of the action and reaction of firms within industries (Smith,
Ferrier, and Ndofor, 2001). This perspective has shown that firm characteristics explain the timing of firm action
as well as the response of rivals to competitive action (Smith et al., 1991, 2001). Prior competitive dynamics
research has identified three underlying drivers of rival behavior: the awareness of market opportunities and
competitors' initiatives, the motivation to act (or respond), and the capability to do so (Smith et al., 2001). We
develop hypotheses on the timing of action within merger waves, and argue that early movers within industry
merger waves have characteristics that lead to greater awareness, motivation, and capability (AMC)
(Chen, 1996). In contrast, later movers have firm characteristics associated with lower levels of AMC, and
respond to their rivals as ‘competitive tension’ increases (Chen, Su, and Tsai, 2007).
Our study makes several contributions. First, we give new insight into the factors that influence the timing of
action within merger waves. Prior research has demonstrated that waves are a common phenomenon and that
the timing of actions within the wave has important strategic consequences (Stearns and Allan, 1996; Carow et
al., 2004). We begin to identify relevant firm factors, including strategic, structural, and resource characteristics,
that influence whether firms lead or follow during merger waves. Second, we demonstrate the applicability of

the competitive dynamics perspective to explain merger and acquisition behavior. Prior competitive dynamics
research has typically included a range of types of actions that include tactical actions, such as price changes,
along with more strategic actions, such as the formation of strategic alliances. With our focus on a single type of
major strategic action, we assess the ability of the competitive dynamics perspective to explain this type of
strategic action. We show that firm characteristics resulting in greater AMC facilitate early action in undertaking
acquisitions within waves, while low AMC firms only act after competitive tension builds (Chen et al., 2007).
Third, we contribute to the competitive dynamics literature by examining the broad interdependence of firms
across multiple markets. By examining all acquisitions undertaken by publicly traded firms, we demonstrate that
the competitive tension that drives action by low AMC firms is not triggered just by actions by the most salient
rivals or by a few firms in the market. In line with the core principles of the interdependent nature of
competition as originally laid out by Schumpeter (1934) and emerging competitive dynamics work that discusses
the role of the industry population in generating competitive tension (Hsieh and Chen, 2010), we find evidence
consistent with the argument that later movers are reacting to competitive tension built up by the collective
action of a broad set of rivals.

Theory and Hypotheses

Merger waves are periods of intense merger and acquisition activity. The beginning of the wave is characterized
by a dramatic increase in the number of executed acquisitions relative to the prior period. This intense period of
activity often reaches a plateau, which can continue for a few years. Finally, there is a significant drop in the
overall activity as the number of acquisitions returns back to pre-wave levels (e.g., Carow et al., 2004;
McNamara et al., 2008). The observation that mergers often occur in waves is one of the ‘most consistent
empirical features of merger activity over the last century’ (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001: 104). Five
major merger waves occurred during the last century (Stearns and Allan, 1996; Martynova and
Renneboog, 2008). These waves were characterized by (1) horizontal mergers (1897–1903) (Banerjee and
Eckard, 2001), (2) vertical mergers (1920s) (Leeth and Borg, 2000), (3) conglomerate mergers (1960s)
(Matsusaka, 1993), (4) increased specialization (1980s takeovers) (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), and (5) equity
transactions (1998–2001) (Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005).
Prior work has assessed the causes of waves, which has isolated several key triggers. Merger waves are
associated with elevated stock prices, as periods of high market-to-book ratios are associated with intense
merger activity (Polonchek and Sushka, 1987; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005). Industry shocks
such as deregulation have also been closely linked to acquisition activity (Andrade et al., 2001; Mitchell and
Mulherin, 1996). More specifically, whether economic, regulatory, and technological shocks drive industry
merger waves depends on whether there is sufficient overall capital liquidity (Harford, 2005).
Prior work also shows that mergers occur because other mergers have already occurred (Qui and Zhou, 2007;
Stearns and Allan, 1996), suggesting the interdependent nature of firms within merger waves. Hence, waves are
a theoretically important context in which to study the interdependence among firms. This notion of
interdependence is consistent with research in competitive dynamics that begins with the conviction that the
performance effects of a firm's strategy (action) depend upon the competitive context in which the strategy is
carried out. When a firm undertakes an action that may affect a rival's position, competitors will be motivated to
respond (Schumpeter, 1942).1 Thus, firms are interdependent in that they feel the moves of one another and are
prone to interact, and firm performance is understood relative to the strategies and actions of rivals. More
specifically, innovative firms in pursuit of superior performance, move early and may enjoy short-lived
advantages, while their actions elicit reactions from rival firms (Chen et al., 2002). Therefore, a firm's decision to
make a competitive move—like entering into a merger wave—may be strongly influenced by concerns about
rival firms' prior actions. A competitive dynamics perspective may be particularly useful in explaining the nature

of acquisition waves as pioneers and early adopters lead, while later movers perceive the moves of their
competitors and react. There are likely a set of pioneers/early adopters that become aware of the same cues,
and are first to take advantage of industry opportunities (e.g., regulatory shifts, easier access to capital, etc.).
Their behavior is viewed by their rivals, which creates ‘competitive tension’ that triggers a response in later
movers (Chen et al., 2007).
Competitive dynamics research has shown that successful firms possess characteristics and resources that lead
to innovative action; while rivals, with their own set of characteristics, then respond to leaders in hopes of
eroding this advantage (Chen, 1996). There are three essential drivers that influence strategic action, collectively
referred to as AMC (Chen, 1996). The awareness (A) of opportunities is when the firm is cognizant of its
competitors, its industry, and its environment, which influences the degree to which a firm perceives emerging
opportunities and understands the likely consequences of its action. Motivation (M) refers to the incentives that
push a firm toward action as it assesses the perceived gains and losses from possible action choices. Finally,
capability (C) encompasses the deployment of resources, and the decision-making processes that allow a firm to
take action (Smith et al., 2001).
Using an AMC perspective, we explore whether firm strategic orientation, structure, and resource endowments
impact upon the timing of firm action within the wave. We focus on these three firm attributes since the
strategy literature identifies the firm's strategic orientation, structure, and resource set as core strategic
attributes of the firm (Porter, 1980; Chandler, 1962; and Barney, 1991). We develop arguments that a firm's
strategic orientation (A) and structure (M) will incline certain types of firms to focus externally and lead in
merger waves. We also postulate that firm resources will influence their capability (C), such that firms with
greater resources will be able to enter waves earlier. However, we also posit that firms lower in AMC will have
more inertial tendencies (Chen and MacMillan, 1992) and will tend to act only after they encounter significant
‘competitive tension’ (Chen et al., 2007). We begin by discussing how a core element of a firm's strategic
orientation, its level of technology and marketing intensity, influences its timing of action within the acquisition
wave. We then discuss the influence of the firm's structure, measured with firm size and diversification level, on
positioning within the wave. Finally, we examine the influence of firm resources on action within the wave.

Strategic orientation: technology and marketing intensity
The level of investment firms make in technology and marketing will influence their awareness to act early in
waves. A decision maker's awareness is largely driven by the strategic investments of the firm because these
investments influence the attentional focus of managers (Ocasio, 1997). Two core strategy attributes that are
likely to influence the attention of managers are technology and marketing intensity (Mauri and
Michaels, 1998). More specifically, we argue that investments in technology and marketing will amplify
managerial awareness since both of these investments will increase the degree to which a firm has an external
and forward-looking focus. Both technology and marketing investments influence the degree to which a firm is
striving to differentiate itself (Miller, 1986, 1988; Spanos, Zaralis, and Lioukas, 2004). In striving for
differentiation, these firms will need to be aware of the competitive actions and positioning of rivals as well as
relevant market and technology trends. Thus, they are likely to become aware of triggers for acquisition waves
earlier than their more inward-focused, efficiency oriented rivals. Additionally, firms that invest in technology
and marketing are likely to strive to stake out leading positions. As Lieberman and Montgomery (1988: 49)
argue, pioneering capabilities emerge from ‘technological foresight, perceptive market research, or skillful
product or process development.’ Thus, investments in technology and marketing give insights that foster
pioneering behavior. In our setting, this will relate to the firm's awareness of market and technology trends that
will trigger acquisition waves. Consistent with this reasoning, prior research has found that firms taking a
leadership or pioneer position in markets tended to be those with strong marketing and innovation capabilities
(Smith and Grimm, 1987; Berry, 2006).

These investments are also likely to increase the motivation of firms to lead acquisition waves. Firms that act
early in acquisition waves are striving to create early mover advantages (McNamara et al., 2008) and position
themselves in a leading position relative to their competitors. Heavy investments in technology and marketing
indicate that a firm is striving to differentiate itself from its competitors and take a market leadership position
(Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Zahra and Covin, 1993). Moreover, internally, the culture of these
organizations is likely to be one of aggressiveness and risk tolerance (Zahra and Covin, 1993). Thus, these firms
are motivated to take a pioneering position in their markets and also have the willingness to take on the
significant risk associated with pioneering.
These arguments are consistent with findings from the literature on new product development and entry. This
research has found that firms investing more heavily in marketing activities (Schoenecker and Cooper, 1998) and
technological development activities (Schoenecker and Cooper, 1998; Robinson and Chiang, 2002) tend to be
market pioneers and early followers. Similarly, we expect to find firms that invest heavily in technology and
marketing will tend to be leaders in acquisition waves, which results in our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the technology and marketing intensity of the firm, the earlier it will act in an
acquisition wave.

Structural factors: acquirer size

Firm size may influence the firm's awareness of opportunities. Prior work suggests that smaller firm size is linked
with exploration (March, 1991), which leads to actionable initiatives (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Firms may
engage in either exploration of new opportunities or exploitation of existing ones (March, 1991). Exploration
includes search, experimentation, and innovation, while exploitation consists of efficiency, execution, and
implementation. Firms more focused on exploitation tend to be more rigid and short-term focused and to
engage less in experimentation. As firm size increases, exploration may decrease as firms become less adaptive,
and as the routinized behavior of larger firms increases their inertial pressures, which often contributes to the
exploitation of existing capabilities instead of the exploration of new opportunities (Levinthal and March, 1993;
March, 1991). Thus, smaller firm size is associated with exploration and increased awareness, leading to earlier
action within an acquisition wave.
Firm size also influences a firm's motivation to push for action. Due to complacency and inertia induced by their
market power, managers of large firms may feel that they are powerful enough to ignore their weaker rivals
(Miller and Chen, 1994). Consistent with this notion, larger firms have been shown to be risk averse (Hitt,
Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1990). In contrast, small firms have been shown to be more active than larger ones in
initiating competitive moves (Chen and Hambrick, 1995). Moreover, smaller firms are more vulnerable and less
insulated from the external environment, which likely motivates them to respond to both threats and
opportunities in order to survive (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Thus, smaller firms have a greater need than their
larger rivals to act aggressively in the market and to challenge the status quo by initiating competitive actions
(Chen and Hambrick, 1995). Finally, competitive dynamics researchers have shown that small firms relative to
large ones are more motivated to initiate competitive action—which has been referred to as ‘action
propensity’—and do so more quickly, resulting in greater ‘action execution speed’ (Smith et al., 2001: 327).
In line with this argument that smaller size is associated with greater awareness and motivation, we expect
smaller firms to quickly respond to opportunities that present themselves early in merger waves. In contrast,
although larger firms are more inertial, their increased size and stature allows them to wait and respond to
competitive pressures rather than be the initiators of action (Chen and Hambrick, 1995). Hence, we propose
that:
Hypothesis 2: The smaller the firm size, the earlier it will tend to act in an acquisition wave.

Structural factors: acquirer diversification

Firm diversification describes the diversity of business lines and/or product markets, with diversified firms
having more complex structures than more focused firms. We posit that more focused firms—which are less
complex and less bureaucratic than more diversified firms—will be more likely to move earlier within acquisition
waves. More specifically, the level of diversification may influence the firm's awareness of opportunities.
Diversification level, which is associated with bureaucracy (e.g., Donaldson, 2003) impacts the broadness of a
firm's search activity. Bureaucracy allows for increased reliability and consistency of behavior in organizations,
which are accomplished through the creation of standard operating procedures, formalized actions, and rigid
rules (Merton, 1957). However, bureaucracy also fosters routines and rule-oriented behavior that lead to
conservatism (Merton, 1968). Bureaucratic routines appear not only to limit innovation (Adler and Borys, 1996)
but such routines also increase standard operation procedures and repetitive behavior, decrease the extent of a
search for alternatives (Haveman, 1993b), and encourage tunnel vision (Miller and Chen, 1996). Such firms tend
to be insular, slower to see emerging opportunities. Moreover, studies have shown that, as structural
complexity—the number of levels and departments—increases so does the probability that the information
being transmitted (e.g., from search) will be distorted as bureaucracy limits information-processing capacity
(Galbraith, 1977).
Diversification also influences motivation. Diversified firms tend to have a corporate layer, which serves as a
buffer between organizational units and external stakeholders (Kraatz and Zajac, 2001). Structural complexity
and bureaucracy of highly diversified firms often protect them from competition and promote insularity
(March, 1981). Relatedly, managers in business units in diversified firms may not be motivated to aggressively
pursue opportunities due to the problem of low power incentives (Williamson, 1996). Managers in large,
diversified firms typically own little equity, but have large fixed claims in salary (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Since
their compensation is largely fixed (Bethel and Liebeskind, 1998), and they don't fully benefit from the value
generated by their organizational unit, these diversified unit managers have little incentive to act aggressively
and take on substantial risk. In addition, more diversified firms may be less motivated to act since a sizable, risky
investment in any division may upset the political balance between divisions (Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1991).
Moreover, in diversified firms there occurs a significant bargaining over resources within the corporate layer
among business units, which may inhibit the speed to respond to competitive challenge (Liebeskind, 2000).
Consistent with these findings, competitive dynamics research has shown that the greater the firm's structural
complexity, the less motivated it is to respond to competitive challenges (i.e., response likelihood). In addition,
single-business firms tend to make competitive moves in limited domains, which enhances their swiftness and
allows for aggressive action (Chen and Hambrick, 1995). Finally, if structurally complex firms do respond, they
are inclined to react after other responding firms (‘response timing’) (Smith et al., 1991: 317). Thus, we predict
that due to their bureaucratic rigidity, more diversified firms will be characterized by more limited awareness
and decreased motivation than more focused firms. As a result, such firms will be slower to enter acquisition
waves until significant competitive pressures overwhelm their bureaucratic rigidity. As a result, we expect:
Hypothesis 3: The less diversified the firm, the earlier it will act in an acquisition wave.

Resource foundations: firm slack

Slack resources represent liquid resources that the firm can leverage to fund competitive action. Slack resources,
therefore, impact a firm's capability to deploy resources and make decisions that allow for action and quick
response to environmental opportunities. Slack resources allow a firm to be opportunity focused and to take
advantage of emergent opportunities (Cyert and March, 1963). Firms with more resources have been shown to
undertake more actions (Smith et al., 1991). For example, firms with higher slack have been shown to have a
greater ability to carry out more competitive moves (Young, Smith, and Grimm, 1996) and to be more able to
initiate strategic change (Bourgeois, 1981). Moreover, high levels of slack resources also increase a firm's ability

to initiate and sustain an aggressive pattern of competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001), and such firms are likely to
respond faster and more effectively to environmental crises than organizations with limited resources
(Meyer, 1982). In contrast, low levels of slack limit the firm's ability to generate needed resources, which
constrains aggressiveness (Young et al., 1996).
Slack also permits the firm the capability to experiment with innovation (Cyert and March, 1963). Empirical
evidence shows that slack resources may facilitate experimenting with new markets because such resources
buffer firms from downside risks, thereby lowering the likelihood of failure (Haveman, 1993a). Hence, slack
causes a relaxation of controls and represents funds that may be used even given uncertainty, which allows the
firm to act in order to exploit potential opportunities to improve margins and revenues that might be derived
from such experimentation (Nohria and Gulati, 1996).
Finally, slack resources give the firm leeway in managing responses to competitive pressure. Firms with high
levels of slack resources have the capability to mobilize resources necessary to respond quickly to competitive
actions by rivals (Fombrun and Ginsberg, 1990; Pettigrew, 1992; Young, et al, 1996). In contrast, low slack firms
are likely to wait to imitate the actions of pioneers since following the actions of rivals is generally less costly
than to pioneer a new action (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). Competitive dynamics research provides
evidence that firms with lower slack are less capable to act independently and are more likely to copy rivals'
actions than firms with greater slack (Smith et al., 1991). Thus, when later movers with lower levels of slack
move in acquisition waves, it is based more on a response to competitive pressures than on an independent
willingness to pioneer.
Since higher slack gives a firm greater capability to act quickly in order to seize opportunities within acquisition
waves, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 4: The greater the firm's slack resources, the earlier it will act in the acquisition wave.

Resource foundations: firm performance

High performing firms likely have high levels of capability to act. There is uncertainty about the prospects of the
wave when it is just starting—as it is not yet a ‘legitimate’ action. Strong firm performance and the resultant
reputational strength benefits firms in several ways (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). First, it aids in raising capital
in the face of decision and environmental uncertainty. Strong performing firms will have an increased capability
to act since their performance leads to positive credit ratings, reputation within the investment community, and
ultimately easy access to capital and debt markets to raise the resources necessary to finance acquisitions early
in waves. The strong reputation of the firm will also give it the confidence to take bold actions such as taking
acquisition actions in response to market or regulatory changes before the legitimacy of such an action is
established. Finally, reputation will provide the firm latitude with stakeholders to take bold action.
In contrast, firms with very low performance are likely to have reduced capability to take on the risky role of
leading an acquisition wave since they will not have access to the resources necessary to finance these risky
acquisitions. Resource availability is a critical determinant of a firm's ability to take on substantial risk (Audia and
Greve, 2006). Poor performance reduces the availability of capital and debt financing for a firm because it leads
to a lower credit rating and an inferior reputation with investors and other stakeholders. Thus, the legitimacy of
high performing firms gives them the ability to take the risky action of entering waves early.
Hypothesis 5: The greater a firm's performance, the earlier it will move in an acquisition wave.

Methods
Sample and data
We assessed industry acquisition waves from 1984 through 2004 following methods consistent with prior
research on acquisition waves (Carow et al., 2004; Harford, 2005; McNamara et al., 2008). Using Securities Data
Corporation (SDC) data, we first calculated the number of completed acquisitions in each four-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code by year. We excluded financial service industries since they have different
asset structures than other industries, and stock market reactions can differ for these industries. We then
looked for relatively short periods—maximum six years—of intense acquisition activity. We used two screens to
conclude whether or not this heightened period of activity was intense enough to meet the criteria of an
acquisition wave. First, the acquisition activity in the peak year of the period had to be at least double both the
first and the last year of the period. Second, we wanted to limit the chance that our wave periods were simply
random occurrences (Harford, 2005). To check this, we first calculated the total number of acquisitions that
occurred during each industry wave. We then simulated 100 distributions of acquisitions over the same length
period, randomly assigning each of the acquisitions to one of the years in the wave period. Then we assessed
the likelihood that the number of acquisitions in the peak year would have occurred by chance. In line with
Harford's (2005) recommendation, each of our peak wave years exceeded the 95th percentile in the simulated
distribution set. Thus, we concluded that none of our waves were likely simply random patterns of acquisitions.
We identified 12 acquisition waves in 12 four-digit SIC coded industries. We had complete firm and acquisition
data for a total of 2,315 completed acquisitions. The waves we identified spanned a wide range of industry
sectors, including manufacturing, logistics, communications, retailing, hospitality, and services. The acquirers
also widely vary in size, with total assets ranging from $ 10M to $ 263B, and total revenue ranging from $ 10M
to $ 160B.2 The mean total assets and revenues in our sample are $ 3.0B and 1.6B, respectively.3 The Tobin's q
values of acquiring firms in our sample are fairly high, with a mean value of 2.87. This is not surprising since
acquisition waves tend to occur during periods of high stock valuations (Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004),
and acquiring firms tend to have high Tobin's q values and use their highly valued stock to acquire firms
(Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). Our dataset includes completed acquisitions in which the acquiring firm was
publicly traded and acquired a majority position in the target firm. We identify the industries and their wave
periods in Table 1.
Table 1. Description of wave industries
SIC
Industry description
Wave date range
Total First
Peak
Last
code
N
year N year N year N
3674
Semiconductor
1998–2001
308
40
125
61
4213
Trucking
1996–2000
101
9
36
6
4225
Warehouse and storage
1995–1999
81
3
31
5
4812
Wireless communications
1992–1997
322
29
81
39
4813
Telephone communications
1998–2002
676
89
227
86
4832
Radio broadcasting
1994–1999
550
63
145
71
5411
Grocery stores
1985–1990
103
10
30
14
5511
Motor vehicle dealers
1996–2000
159
9
47
21
6512
Real estate operators
1996–2000
1249 80
544
79
7011
Hotels
1995–1999
721
83
222
73
7374
Computer processing services
1996–2000
217
30
61
26
7375
Information retrieval services
1997–2001
1855 122
699
336
Data on acquisitions, their dates, and the form of payment came from the SDC database. Financial data were
obtained from Compustat.

Dependent variable

Timing of action in the wave: To calculate the timing of firm action within an acquisition wave, we calculated the
number of days that each acquisition announcement occurred after the first acquisition in the wave. We then
divided this by the total number of days in the wave. Thus, the end score ranged from zero to one, with the first
acquisition in the wave having the lowest value and the last acquisition in the wave having the highest value. If
two or more acquisitions occurred on the same day, they carried the same timing value.

Independent variables
Acquirer technology and marketing intensity: Technology intensity is measured as the research and
development (R&D) intensity (R&D/sales) of the firm one year prior to the acquisition announcement. Since the
level of R&D intensity greatly varies across industries, we calculated and used an industry-adjusted R&D
intensity measure by subtracting the industry average from the firm's R&D intensity, using the firm's four-digit
SIC code. Marketing intensity is similarly measured using the industry-adjusted advertising intensity
(advertising/sales) of the firm one year prior to the acquisition announcement. These two variables are very
highly correlated, (𝑟𝑟 = 0.82). Thus, to avoid colinearity issues, we average the two values to get an overall
technology and marketing-intensity variable.

Acquirer size: We measured firm size as the logarithm of total assets of the acquirer one year prior to the merger
announcement.4
Acquirer diversification: We measured the organizational-level of diversification with the entropy index for the
organization (Palepu, 1985). The level of diversification is measured one year prior to the acquisition
announcement.
Acquirer financial slack: Researchers have discussed both unabsorbed and absorbed slack and their influence on
firm action (Singh, 1986). Unabsorbed slack refers to excess, uncommitted, liquid resources in organizations,
which impact the firm's ability to carry out actions (Smith et al., 2001). In contrast, absorbed slack reflects excess
resources in the firm's cost structure (Singh, 1986) and provides a buffer against environmental challenges. Since
unabsorbed slack is more closely related to major strategic actions, such as mergers and acquisitions, than
absorbed slack, we focus on the role of unabsorbed slack in leading to slack search that will result in taking a
leadership position in the wave. Following Haunschild (1993), we measured unabsorbed acquirer financial slack
in two ways. First, slack was operationalized as the debt-to-equity ratio—a conventional measure inversely
related to slack (Bourgeois, 1981). Second, we assessed the percentage of free cash flow, defined as (operating
income—taxes—interest expense—depreciation—preferred dividend—common dividend)/equity. Both
variables were measured at the end of the year before the acquisition year.
Acquiring firm prior performance: Prior firm performance was measured with the firm's return on assets (ROA)
one year prior to the acquisition.5

Control variables

Since this is the first study to examine timing of action in merger waves, we were not able to draw upon prior
work to generate control variables. However, we included a number of control variables to account for industryspecific factors as well as firm characteristics that may relate to merger behavior. First, we included industry
dummy variables to control systematic differences across the industries explored in the study. Second, we drew
upon work by Harford (2005) to identify factors that may trigger merger waves. We controlled for these same
factors because they may relate not only to the incidence of merger waves but also to activity within merger
waves. We used Tobin's q to control for the firm's relative market valuation since firms highly valued by the
market may be more likely to use their inflated stock to finance acquisitions. We also included controls for both
sales and employee growth since a firm's growth rate may influence its acquisition behavior. We used industry

adjusted values for sales growth since growth rates vary over time and across industry settings. We first
calculated the mean value of sales growth for each industry in each year. We then calculated the difference
between the firm's sales growth and the industry average sales growth value to measure the industry adjusted
value. Following Harford (2005), we also controlled for the firm's asset turnover (sales/assets) and capital
intensity (capital expenditures/sales). All of the firm-specific financial variables were measured in the year prior
to the focal acquisition. In addition, we controlled for the number of acquisitions a firm undertakes in the wave
because the degree to which a firm regularly undertakes acquisitions and is a serial acquirer may also influence
its acquisition timing. Finally, we included a dummy variable indicating whether the acquirer and target were in
the same four-digit SIC code—industry relatedness—since this may influence the acquirer's awareness of the
wave opportunity.

Analysis
We used fixed-effects regression to test our hypotheses with industry fixed effects. This allowed us to control for
idiosyncratic industry differences that were not accounted for by our control variables. We also analyzed the
data using Tobit analysis because the dependent variable is censored at zero and one. Finally, we conducted an
analysis where we only focused on the first acquisition of each firm. We present all three analyses in our results
table, but since the three analyses provide consistent results, we focus our interpretation on the fixed-effects
regression model results in which we included all observations.

Results

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables in this study.6 The correlations
between our IVs and positioning in the wave are in line with a number of our hypotheses. Also, the correlations
between the independent variables are moderate to low, indicating that multicolinearity is not an issue.

Table 2. Summary statistics and correlation table
Variables
Mean S.D.
1
2
3
4
5
6
1. Timing of
0.50
0.22
action in the
wave
2. Industry
0.72
0.45
− 0.06
relatedness
3. Tobin's q
2.87
4.15
0.09
− 0.14
4. Sales growth
0.00
1.01
− 0.00 0.01
0.08
5. Employee
2.93
4.20
− 0.06 0.05
− 0.01 0.02
growth
6. Capital
0.06
0.34
0.02
− 0.05 0.04
0.12
0.00
intensity
7. Asset
0.61
0.77
− 0.02 − 0.12 0.03
− 0.08 − 0.04 0.11
turnover
8. Number of
8.71
8.41
− 0.13 0.23
− 0.15 0.07
− 0.11 − 0.18
acquisitions
9. Technology
0.03
0.09
− 0.13 0.08
− 0.18 0.06
− 0.01 0.38
and marketing
intensity
10. Firm size
6.31
1.67
0.10
− 0.09 − 0.04 − 0.05 − 0.03 − 0.06
11. Level of
0.13
0.32
0.14
− 0.19 − 0.00 − 0.10 − 0.03 0.07
diversification
12. Debt/Equity 0.86
2.69
0.09
0.06
− 0.08 − 0.06 − 0.14 − 0.06
13. Free cash
− 0.06 1.43
− 0.08 0.02
0.01
− 0.02 0.15
− 0.02
flow
14. Prior firm
0.00
0.13
− 0.10 0.06
− 0.07 − 0.08 − 0.10 − 0.07
performance
N = 2315, if r > = 0.06 then p < 0.01, if r > = 0.04 then p < 0.05, if r > = 0.03 then p < 0.10.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

− 0.24
− 0.03

0.11

− 0.22
0.04

0.10
− 0.16

0.03
− 0.02

0.24

− 0.05
0.04

0.07
− 0.01

0.03
0.01

0.07
0.03

− 0.00
0.01

− 0.32

0.05

0.11

0.04

0.24

0.05

0.08

0.12

Table 3 presents the fixed-effects regression results with timing of action in the wave as the dependent variable.
We used a fixed-effects model so that we could control for differences in the constructs between the industries
included in the study. For simplicity of presentation, we do not report the industry intercepts for any of the
models. Looking at our control variables, as expected, there is some evidence that faster growing firms move
earlier in the wave. We see a significant negative relationship in our full sample analysis between employee
growth and position in the wave (𝑝𝑝 < 0.05). In the analysis focusing on first acquisitions only, there is a
negative relationship between sales growth and position in the wave (𝑝𝑝 < 0.05). We also find that more
efficient firms, those with faster asset turnover ratios, tend to move earlier in the wave (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01). Also as
expected, firms that acquire more frequently tend to move earlier in the wave (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01). However, we were
surprised to find that firms with high Tobin's q values tended to move later in the wave (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01). We now
turn our attention to our hypothesized relationships.

Table 3. Drivers of the timing of firm action within the wave
Variable

se
(0.11)
(0.22)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.16)
(0.08)
(0.01)

Tobit
analysis
β
0.07
0.49*
0.31**
− 0.08*
0.24†
− 0.04
− 0.02**

se
(0.10)
(0.21)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.15)
(0.05)
(0.01)

Fixed-effects regression for the
first acquisition of each firm
β
− 0.27†
0.83*
− 0.13*
0.07
− 0.16
− 0.19†
− 0.12**

se
(0.18)
(0.45)
(0.08)
(0.08)
(0.32)
(0.12)
(0.02)

− 1.86**

(0.36)

− 1.71**

(0.33)

− 3.90**

(0.80)

H1: Higher levels lead to
earlier wave position.

0.34**

(0.06)

0.30**

(0.06)

0.16†

(0.11)

0.20**

(0.05)

0.22**

(0.04)

0.20**

(0.08)

Firm resource
endowments
Debt/Equity (inverse of
slack resources)
Free cash flow

H2: Larger firms will act later
in the wave.
H3: More diversified firms
will act later in wave.

Level of diversification

0.25**

(0.06)

0.27**

(0.06)

0.19*

(0.11)

− 0.52*

(0.27)

− 0.46*

(0.26)

− 0.55*

(0.28)

Prior firm performance

− 0.37**

(0.07)

− 0.31**

(0.06)

− 0.70**

(0.16)

R2
F
N

0.11
542.11**
2315

Control variables
Industry relatedness
Tobin's q
Sales growth
Employee growth
Capital intensity
Asset turnover
Number of acquisitions in
wave
Strategic orientation of
the firm
Technology and
marketing intensity
Firm structural elements
Firm size

Fixed-effects regression for all
acquisitions of each firm
β
− 0.06
0.55**
0.01
− 0.08*
0.39**
− 0.21**
− 0.03**

2315

0.14
154.94**
897

Anticipated relationship

H4: Higher D/E firms will act
later in wave.
H4: Greater free cash flow
leads to earlier action.
H5: Higher performing firms
act earlier in wave.

† 𝑝𝑝 < 0.10, * 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05, ** 𝑝𝑝 < 0.01, one-tailed tests. For simplicity of presentation, we do not report the industry intercepts for any of the models.

Overall, the results show significant support for our hypotheses. First, a firm's strategic orientation appears to
have a significant influence on its positioning within the acquisition wave. In line with Hypothesis 1, we find a
negative relationship between technology and marketing intensity and temporal action within the wave (𝑝𝑝 <
0.01). This finding suggests that firms that invest heavily in R&D and advertising act earlier in the acquisition
wave. Similarly, faster growing firms tend to move earlier in the wave.

We also find strong evidence that the structural elements of the firm influence the timing of its involvement
within an acquisition wave. Supporting Hypothesis 2, the positive and significant relationship (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01)
between firm size and temporal action in the wave indicates that smaller firms tend to acquire earlier in the
acquisition wave than larger firms. In line with Hypothesis 3, the positive and significant finding for the level of
diversification (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01) indicates that more diversified firms act later in the acquisition wave. In a
supplemental analysis, we found that the effect for level of diversification was only significant for related
acquisitions. This is consistent with the idea that high levels of diversification reduce managers' awareness of
and willingness to exploit opportunities within their existing markets.
Finally, the results support our contention that the resources of a firm influence its timing within acquisition
waves. The results from Table 3 reveal a positive and significant relationship (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01) between a firm's
debt/equity ratio and acquisition position within the merger wave, as well as a negative relationship between
free cash flow and action timing (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01). This suggests that firms with higher levels of slack resources
(those with low debt/equity ratios, and high free cash flow) tend to acquire firms earlier in the acquisition wave.
Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was supported. Finally, we find a negative relationship between prior firm performance
and action timing (𝑝𝑝 < 0.01), indicating that better performing firms tend to act earlier in the acquisition
wave. This finding provides support for Hypothesis 5.7

Discussion and Conclusion
We explored firm-level factors associated with the timing of firm entry into merger waves. In contrast to prior
strategic management work that has examined consequences of a firm's timing of action within a wave (e.g.,
Carow et al., 2004), we focused on causes that influence the timing of firm entry into a merger wave. Drawing
on a competitive dynamics framework, we argued that leaders within these waves will have different strategic
orientations, structural characteristics, and resource endowments that lead to their early position and that
separate them from later movers that respond to leaders (Chen, 1996). Our results provided considerable
support for our hypotheses and are consistent with an AMC perspective in which early as compared to late
movers in merger waves have greater awareness of their environment, increased motivation to act, and
superior capability to take action.
We found that a firm's strategic orientation was related to position in a merger wave. Specifically, we found that
early movers had higher R&D and advertising intensity, suggesting that a technology and marketing focus leads
to early action. These results are consistent with the notion that a strategic focus on technology and marketing
amplifies the degree to which a firm has an external focus, which increases the likelihood that a firm will act
early in a merger wave. These results are also consistent with the idea that investments in technology and
marketing motivate a firm to strive to differentiate itself from its competitors and take a market leadership
position (Zahra and Covin, 1993). Such firms tend to have a risk-tolerant culture that makes it more likely that
they will take aggressive action (Zahra and Covin, 1993).
A firm's structure was also shown to influence position within a wave. Specifically, early movers were found to
be smaller, which suggests that they are more likely to explore (March, 1991). Smaller firms are also more
vulnerable and less insulated from the external environment, and, hence, they may have a greater need than
larger rivals to act aggressively in the market and to challenge the status quo by initiating competitive actions

(Chen and Hambrick, 1995). In addition, such firms appear to be more motivated than large firms to initiate
competitive moves (Chen and Hambrick, 1995). Moreover, early movers were also less diversified. As a result,
such firms likely search more for alternatives than more bureaucratic firms do. Based on a more complex
structure, diversified firms with a corporate layer are protected from competition, and so would be more likely
to move slower than more focused firms. Additionally, in diversified firms there occurs a significant bargaining
over resources within the corporate layer among business units, which may inhibit the speed to respond to
competitive challenge (Liebeskind, 2000).
Finally, resources affect when firms enter merger waves. We found that firms with higher slack moved earlier in
waves. This finding is consistent with the notion that firms with large pools of liquid resources deploy them in
opportunity-focused investments, as it allows firms to take advantage of emergent opportunities (Cyert and
March, 1963). Consistent with our finding, slack has been associated with firms carrying out more competitive
moves (Young et al., 1996), initiating strategic change (Bourgeois, 1981), and following an aggressive pattern of
competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001). Early movers were also shown to have solid performance, which suggests
these firms have a strong capability to act as their performance leads to strong credit ratings, reputation within
the investment community, and easier access to capital and debt markets than weaker performers, which allows
them to raise the resources necessary to finance acquisitions early in waves. Overall, then, this study provides
greater understanding of strategic, structural, and resource determinants of firm actions in industry merger
waves, as we elaborate upon firm-level factors that help predict the temporal action within acquisition waves.
We also contend that this study extends the competitive dynamics perspective by specifically relating it to the
timing of discrete, large-scale strategic actions. Hence, we have applied competitive dynamics principles more
directly to major strategic choices than in prior work. Moreover, although competitors attend and respond to
one another's moves (e.g., Schumpeter, 1934), much of competitive dynamics research has focused on the
dyadic nature of interfirm rivalry (e.g., Ferrier, Smith, and Grimm, 1999; Ferrier, 2001). Our study refocuses
competitive dynamics work back to its original conceptualization, as our view is consistent with the
interdependent nature of competition found in the Austrian school (e.g., Schumpeter, 1934) in which
competitors become aware of one another's actions and react accordingly (Hsieh and Chen, 2010). Emerging
competitive dynamics research acknowledges the interdependent nature of the entire population of firms
within industries and notes that as the actions from an increasing number of rivals' increase, remaining firms are
compelled to take action in response to mounting competitive tension (Hsieh and Chen, 2010). Thus, our
findings, as well as this emerging work, suggest that competitive dynamics is an underutilized framework that
can be applied beyond specific dyadic settings to broader industry settings to effectively explore multiple rival
actions and firm responses, and we encourage future competitive dynamics work to continue to explore the
aggregate impact of the actions of multiple rivals.
The results of this study have obvious practical implications for managers seeking to exploit early mover
advantages within acquisitions waves. We know from prior work, that early movers in acquisition waves
outperform later movers (McNamara et al., 2008); hence, firm characteristics and resources that lead to early
action within waves potentially have beneficial firm effects. We advise firms with superior AMC characteristics
to attempt early movement in waves because they have more of the skills needed to carry out acquisitions early
in waves when acquisition performance tends to be strongest. Our findings should encourage smaller, more
nimble players with simpler structures that have invested in technological and market awareness to move early,
especially when they have access to appropriate funding (i.e., slack). Conversely, we also advise firms without
superior AMC characteristics either to develop such skills and motivation or simply to stay out of waves—as
firms without strong AMC characteristics tend to act later in waves when performance turns negative. We
realize that many of the firm characteristics we examined are difficult to change (e.g., strategy, structure), so
even if firms want to increase their AMC, they may only be able to do so in limited ways (e.g., increase external

awareness with greater R&D intensity and advertising intensity, and move with sufficient slack resources). Still,
given the high costs of failed acquisitions later in waves, it seems more prudent not to acquire rather than to
acquire later in the waves.

Limitations and future directions

We see opportunities to further develop the lines of inquiry in understanding merger waves. While we examined
early and late movers in waves, exploring the influences of capabilities and resources that distinguish
participation and nonparticipation within merger waves also seems worthwhile. That is, while our results were
consistent with the notion that high AMC firms tend to move earlier than low AMC firms in merger waves, our
study does not clarify the characteristics of non-movers. Logically, we would assume that non-movers likely have
less motivation to enter waves than wave participants; however, we do not know why they are less motivated.
For example, as stated earlier, there are financial advantages in not moving late within waves, and if
nonparticipants contemplated moving but were aware that remaining opportunities were potentially unfruitful,
such an ability to assess a possible acquisition and resist the pressure to move within a wave would be a
financially beneficial skill worth exploring both for strategy scholars and practitioners.
We should also note that although this was the first study to predict acquisition timing within a merger wave,
we only predicted main effects. Future work would benefit by exploring more nuanced findings that could be
provided by exploring interaction effects with our main effects variables. Additionally, although we did include
various industry-, firm-, and acquisition-level control variables, it may be that we have not controlled for the
broadest possible set of variables that could affect a firm's temporal positioning within the wave. For example,
future research could examine whether and how the macroeconomic factors that contribute to the initiation of
an acquisition wave moderate the factors that influence the timing of firm participation in the wave. Therefore,
we encourage future research to look for additional variables that could influence the timing of firm action
within waves.
In addition, we suggest that multiple methods be used to increase the insight into both leader and follower
characteristics as well as to provide additional insight into industry merger wave patterns. We used a large,
archival sample to examine our research question, which had the advantage of generating broadly generalizable
results. However, we encourage the use of more fine-grained research methodologies, such as interviews and
survey methodology that may make it possible to develop a more nuanced cognitive assessment of how and
when leaders and followers gather (e.g., scanning, experimenting), process (e.g., adaptability and speed), filter,
and apply information that helps them decide whether and when to move within merger waves. That is, while
we speculate that our firm characteristics drive the awareness, motivation, and capabilities of firms that, in turn,
influence firm timing within acquisition waves, using an archival approach, we are unable to directly measure
awareness, motivation, or capability to take action. Similarly, we are unable to directly measure the ‘competitive
tension’ firms' face. Hence, we encourage future work to use other approaches to directly examine AMC of firms
as well as the perceptions in the firm regarding competitive tension within its markets. Thus, we see ample
opportunity for future researchers to extend our understanding of the factors that influence participants in
merger waves, the decision processes of leaders and followers within such waves, and post-merger wave activity
such as divestitures that are a reaction to merger waves. Such work also has the potential to further develop
theory on competitive dynamics.
Finally, our results lend further confidence to the competitive dynamics notion that firm characteristics and
resources predict early mover actions and follower responses in the context of merger waves. Importantly, we
believe the competitive dynamics predictions set forth in this paper will also apply to other contexts in which
firms are interdependent. Since waves are periods of heightened activity that are triggered by the actions of
early movers (which are often associated with innovation) and the imitative responses of later movers, we

expect to see this form of interdependence in many forms of strategically relevant actions. For example, we
anticipate that waves occur in such contexts as management fads, technology trajectories, new product
introductions, and compensation practices, which all appear to be characterized by early mover action, and later
mover reaction. Therefore, waves appear to be prevalent but under-researched, and our findings should
encourage other strategic management researchers to apply the competitive dynamics framework to other
large-scale strategic events that take the form of waves in an attempt to more fully understand the
interdependent nature of competition.
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Notes
1 Within the competitive-dynamics perspective, ‘action’ is a specific and detectable competitive move initiated
by a firm to improve its relative competitive position, while a ‘response’ is a clear-cut and discernible
counteraction taken by a competing firm with regard to one or more competitors to defend or improve
its position (Smith et al., 1991).
2 We limited our sample to firms with at least $ 10M in both total assets and sales. This is consistent with prior
research (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997) and is logical in this setting since actions by extremely small
firms are unlikely to trigger a reaction by larger firms in the market.
3 We studied only firms that entered the acquisition wave. Non-acquirers were not studied.
4 To insure that our results were not driven by a small set of extremely large firms, we also conducted three
additional analyses in which we removed firms that were above size cutoffs of $ 25B, $ 10B, and $ 1B in
sales. The results for firm size were consistent in these analyses with the one presented here.
5 As a robustness check, we also used an industry adjusted ROA value for prior firm performance. The results
from that analysis are consistent with those reported here.
6 To ensure that our results were not being driven by outliers, we Winsorized our independent variables using a
99 percent Winsorization value.
7 We also conducted a supplemental analysis in which we used slack and performance measures from the year
before the beginning of the acquisition wave. The results from that analysis are similar to those reported
here and are available from the authors upon request.
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